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The	Relational	Conception	of	Practical	Authority	N.	P.	Adams		In	 this	article	 I	articulate	a	new	conception	of	practical	authority	based	on	an	analysis	of	the	relationship	between	authorities	and	subjects.	When	one	person	issues	a	command	to	another,	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	 relationship	 obtains	 and	 the	 commander	 signals	 that	 this	relationship	is	appropriate.	Most	importantly,	commands	demand	practical	deference	from	subjects,	so	issuing	a	command	to	another	person	signals	that	such	a	demand	for	deference	is	justified.	We	usually	do	not	stand	in	a	relationship	of	deference	to	other	people,	let	alone	in	a	relationship	where	deference	can	be	unilaterally	demanded.	Analyzing	the	conditions	under	which	such	an	unusual	relationship	is	justified	illuminates	the	conditions	for	genuine	(or	legitimate,	or	justified,	or	de	jure)	practical	authority.1	My	 analysis	 results	 in	 four	 conditions:	 the	 duty,	 precedence,	 acceptance,	 and	
trustworthiness	conditions,	which	together	constitute	the	relational	conception	of	practical	authority.	The	conditions	put	constraints	on	both	parties	in	an	authority	relationship;	if	and	only	if	the	conditions	are	jointly	met	can	one	person	have	genuine	practical	authority	over	another	person.	The	primary	virtue	of	the	relational	analysis	is	that	it	frames	the	question	of	 authority	 not	 simply	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 conditions	 on	 rational	 deference	 but	 in	 terms	 of	when	it	is	appropriate	for	both	parties	to	enter	a	certain	kind	of	relationship.	The	standing	to	issue	commands	needs	justification	as	much	as	the	position	of	deference	does.		This	 emphasis	 on	 the	 authority	 herself	 grounds	 the	most	 distinctive	 parts	 of	 the	relational	 conception;	 in	 other	 respects,	 it	 builds	 on	 Joseph	 Raz’s	 influential	 service	conception.2	The	uniquely	relational	elements	of	my	analysis	add	 important	depth	 to	our	understanding	 of	 authority.3	 Raz	 and	 much	 of	 the	 literature	 that	 follows	 him	 frame	authority	through	the	perspective	of	the	subject,	focusing	on	whether	obeying	an	authority																																																																					1	 I	 prefer	 ‘genuine’	 because,	 first,	 it	 is	 an	 open	 question	 how	 an	 institution’s	 legitimacy	 depends	 on	 its	possession	of	authority	qua	Hohfeldian	power.	Calling	genuine	authority	“legitimate”	obscures	this	question,	particularly	in	the	political	context.	On	this	distinction,	see	N.	P.	Adams,	“Institutional	Legitimacy,”	The	Journal	
of	 Political	 Philosophy	 (forthcoming);	 Christopher	 W.	 Morris,	 An	 Essay	 on	 the	 Modern	 State	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 1998),	 ch.	 4;	 Allen	 Buchanan,	 The	 Heart	 of	 Human	 Rights	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	University	Press,	2012),	ch.	6.	Second,	understanding	authority	as	a	normative	power	means	that	one	either	has	authority	or	one	does	not;	“unjustified”	possession	of	the	power	is	incoherent.	A	claim	to	authority	can	be	justified	or	not,	but	 claiming	 is	distinct	 from	possessing.	Third,	 ‘de	 jure’	 conjures	 legal	authority	 rather	 too	closely	for	my	broader	concerns.		2	Joseph	Raz,	The	Morality	of	Freedom	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1986).	3	Others	have	pursued	relational—in	some	sense—analyses	of	authority.	Most	prominently:	Stephen	Darwall,	“Authority	 and	 Second-Personal	 Reasons	 for	 Acting,”	 in	 Morality,	 Authority,	 and	 Law:	 Essays	 in	 Second-
Personal	 Ethics	 I	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	 2013):	 pp.	 135-150.	 Darwall’s	 analysis	 is	 part	 of	 his	broader	theory	of	normative	ethics	and	so	requires	many	contested	theoretical	commitments.	My	approach	is	intentionally	 ecumenical	 to	 a	wide	 range	 of	 comprehensive	moral	 theories.	 Scott	 Hershovitz,	 “The	 Role	 of	Authority,”	Philosopher’s	Imprint	11	(2011):	pp.	1-19	incorporates	relations	in	yet	another	manner.		
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can	 be	 rational	 or	 consistent	 with	 autonomy.4	 Answering	 these	 difficult	 questions	 is	important	 for	 our	 understanding	 of	 authority.	 But	 authority,	 as	 I	 will	 argue,	 is	 robustly	relational	 and	 focusing	 on	 only	 one	 party	 in	 the	 relationship	 leaves	 us	with	 a	 one-sided	understanding	 of	 authority,	 which	 in	 turn	 generates	 an	 inappropriately	 limited	 set	 of	normative	conditions	on	authority.	Authority	is	about	whether	one	person	has	the	standing	to	 demand	 deference	 from	 another,	 not	 just	 about	 when	 deference	 is	 rational	 or	autonomous.		Here	is	the	plan.	In	the	first	section	I	characterize	the	concept	of	authority,	following	Raz’s	 rationalist	approach.	 In	section	 two	 I	undertake	 the	relational	analysis.	 In	 the	 third	section	I	argue	for	four	conditions	on	genuine	authority	that	can	make	sense	of	the	claims	intrinsic	 to	 the	authority	 relationship	articulated	 in	 section	 two.	Finally,	 in	 section	 four	 I	compare	the	relational	conception	to	the	service	conception	and	apply	it	to	institutions.		 I.	Authority		In	 the	 sense	 I	 am	 concerned	with,	 authority	 is	 a	Hohfeldian	normative	power.5	 Someone	with	 authority	 can	 change	 the	 elements	 of	 another	 person’s	 normative	 standing	 (the	collection	 of	 her	 Hohfeldian	 advantages	 and	 disadvantages)	 simply	 by	 expressing	 her	intent	 that	 those	elements	change.6	We	all	have	 the	power	 to	change	our	own	normative	standing	in	important	and	decisive	ways.	You	have	a	standing	claim-right	not	to	be	struck	but	 can	waive	 that	 right	 and	 thereby	waive	others’	 correlative	duty	not	 to	 strike	 you,	 as	boxers	do	in	a	boxing	match.	Authority	 is	akin	to	having	this	power	of	self-determination	over	someone	else.		Authorities	determine	how	others	may	act	and	how	they	may	be	acted	upon;	 they	drastically	shape	the	position	of	a	person	in	their	community	and	their	relationships.	This	is	a	surprising	power	to	have	over	someone	else,	to	put	it	mildly.	Authority	is	prima	facie	seriously	objectionable	in	significant	part	because	it	 involves	having	control	over	another	person’s	normative	standing	in	a	way	that	our	autonomy	rights	usually	protect	against.	Authority	 is	 exercised	 by	 issuing	 commands,	 which	 importantly	 require	 mutual	recognition	 in	 order	 to	 succeed.	 (Here	 I	 use	 ‘command’	 in	 the	 somewhat	 technical	 sense	that	identifies	exercises	of	authority	and	so	has	the	characteristics	identified	below,	rather																																																																					4	 See	 Scott	 Shapiro,	 “Authority,”	 in	 Jules	 L.	 Coleman,	 Kenneth	 Einar	Himma,	 and	 Scott	 J.	 Shapiro	 (ed.),	The	
Oxford	Handbook	of	Jurisprudence	and	Philosophy	of	Law	(Oxford:	Oxford	UP,	2002):	pp.	382-438.		5	Wesley	 Newcomb	Hohfeld,	 Fundamental	 Legal	 Conceptions	 as	 Applied	 to	 Judicial	 Reasoning	 (New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	1919).	6	On	authority	 as	 a	Hohfeldian	power,	 see	Raz,	The	Morality	 of	 Freedom;	 Leslie	Green,	The	Authority	 of	 the	
State	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1988);	Stephen	Perry,	“Political	Authority	and	Political	Obligation,”	in	Leslie	Green	 and	 Brian	 Leiter	 (ed.),	Oxford	 Studies	 in	 Philosophy	 of	 Law	Vol.	 2	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	2013):	pp.	1-74.	Other	senses	of	authority,	which	I	am	not	concerned	with	here,	include	authorized	force	and	the	bindingness	of	reasons	generally.	
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than	 in	 the	 broader	 sense	 of	 any	 kind	 of	 directive.)	 Commands	 involve	 the	 particular	reflexive	 intention	 that	 is	 distinctive	 of	 certain	 kinds	 of	 illocutionary	 acts:	 the	 speaker	accomplishes	 a	 particular	 act	 by	 expressing	 her	 intent	 to	 accomplish	 that	 act	 to	 the	recipient	and	 intending	 that	 the	act	be	accomplished	by	 the	recipient’s	recognition	of	 the	speaker’s	intention.7	I	could	impose	a	duty	to	stop	on	you	in	a	variety	of	ways,	for	example	by	stepping	into	a	crosswalk.	When	I	command	you	to	stop,	for	example	as	a	traffic	cop,	I	express	my	intention	to	change	your	normative	standing	by	imposing	a	duty	to	stop.	If	you	accept	my	 authority,	 you	 treat	my	 intention	 as	 successful	 so	 you	 take	 yourself	 to	 have	 a	duty	to	stop	(and,	under	favorable	conditions,	therefore	also	form	an	intention	to	stop	and	stop).	 If	you	treat	my	utterance	as	a	 joke	or	a	request,	 it	 fails	as	a	command	because	you	don’t	recognize	my	intention	to	bind	you.	Commands	(of	genuine	authorities)	change	normative	standing,	which	in	general	is	determined	by	the	balance	of	reasons.	For	example,	ceteris	paribus	the	weighty	reasons	of	others’	rights	and	our	reasons	to	avoid	causing	suffering	defeat	the	reasons	we	might	have	to	strike	someone,	so	we	have	a	duty	not	to	strike	them.	Changes	in	our	normative	standing	are	 the	result	of	changes	 in	our	reasons,	 so	 the	power	 to	change	another’s	standing	with	commands	must	 be	 the	 result	 of	 some	 capacity	 to	 change	 their	 reasons	 in	 a	 unique	 and	drastic	manner.	This	 is	 the	basis	 for	Raz’s	 rationalist	approach	 to	authority,	 according	 to	which	commands	constitute	preemptive	and	content-independent	practical	reasons.		Commands	 constitute	 preemptive	 reasons	 because	 commands	 don’t	 simply	 add	another	 consideration	 to	 the	 balance	 of	 reasons,	 commands	 determine	 how	 the	 balance	will	 go.8	 This	 contrasts	 with	 the	 normal	 way	 we	 give	 others	 reasons,	 for	 example	 by	request.	Your	boss’	 command	 to	attend	a	meeting	 is	very	different	 from	your	coworker’s	request.	Your	coworker’s	 request	gives	you	a	reason	 to	attend	 the	meeting	but	may	very	well	 be	 outweighed	 by	 your	 need	 to	 do	 other	 work.	 Your	 boss’	 command,	 on	 the	 other	hand,	 preempts	 the	 other	 (employment-related)	 reasons	 you	 have	 and	 gives	 you	 an	(employment)	obligation	to	attend	the	meeting,	even	if	you	are	very	busy.	The	commands	of	authorities	preempt	other	reasons	instead	of	being	weighed	against	them,	so	determine	normative	standing.	Preemption	captures	the	sense	in	which	commands	bind	subjects.	Commands	constitute	content-independent	reasons	because	the	force	of	a	command	comes	from	qualities	of	the	commander,	not	from	qualities	of	the	content	of	the	command.9	When	a	parent	exercises	her	parental	authority	and	commands	her	child	to	go	to	bed,	the	child	may	ask	why	 they	should	obey.	A	paradigmatic	 response	 is	 “Because	 I	 told	you	 to.”	The	parent	avoids	explaining	the	merits	of	a	good	night’s	sleep,	instead	appealing	directly																																																																					7	J.	L.	Austin,	How	to	Do	Things	with	Words	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1955);	P.	F.	Strawson,	“Intention	and	Convention	in	Speech	Acts,”	The	Philosophical	Review	73	(1964):	pp.	439-460.	8	This	needs	various	qualifications,	e.g.	commands	from	authorities	only	bind	within	their	jurisdiction,	so	may	not	determine	the	balance	of	a	subject’s	reasons	all	things	considered.	9	N.	P.	Adams,	“In	Defense	of	Content-Independence,”	Legal	Theory	(forthcoming).	
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to	her	standing	as	a	sufficient	reason	for	obedience.	A	stranger	who	issued	a	command	with	the	same	content	would	not	bind	the	child	to	go	to	bed	because	the	stranger	doesn’t	stand	in	 the	appropriate	 relationship	 to	 the	child.	An	appeal	 to	 the	qualities	of	 the	commander	rather	than	the	merits	of	the	command	is	essential	to	authority:	if	subjects	only	acted	when	they	judged	the	content	of	a	command	to	be	of	high	quality,	then	authority	loses	its	value	as	a	practice	and	its	place	in	our	social	world.	The	whole	idea	is	that	 the	command	replaces	the	subject’s	individual	judgment.10		When	 we	 combine	 the	 insight	 that	 commands	 are	 illocutionary	 speech	 acts	 with	preemption	and	content-independence,	we	get	the	following	picture:	authorities	have	the	power	 to	 determine	 subjects’	 standing,	 regardless	 of	 subjects’	 other	 (in-jurisdiction)	reasons,	just	because	the	authority	said	so,	simply	by	conveying	the	intention	to	effect	such	a	 change.	 The	 question	 for	 any	 account	 of	 authority	 is	 how	 one	 person	 could	 have	 such	dramatic	and	unusual	control	over	another.			 II.	The	Relational	Analysis		In	 this	 section	 I	 analyze	 the	 relationship	 that	 obtains	 between	 two	 persons	 when	 one	claims	authority	over	another.	I	borrow	my	general	methodology	from	some	contemporary	epistemology	 of	 testimony.11	 On	 these	 accounts,	 testimony	 involves	 the	 particular	relational	act	of	telling	to:	a	hearer’s	reasons	to	believe	that	p	on	the	basis	of	testimony	that	p	are	distinct	from	reasons	based	on	a	mere	assertion	that	p.	Testifying	involves	presenting	an	 assertion	 as	 responding	 to	 another	 person’s	 epistemic	 needs	 and	 putting	 one’s	reputation	behind	the	assertion.	But	we	rarely	explicitly	state	that	we	are	responding	to	an	epistemic	need	or	 that	we	stand	behind	our	assertion.	 Instead	we	 find	 these	elements	of	testimony	in	the	signals	and	implicit	claims	that	structure	the	testimonial	relationship.12	As	Edward	 Hinchman	 writes,	 “We	 cannot	 understand	 the	 nature	 of	 telling	 without	understanding	how	it	functions	in	the	real	world	of	human	relations.”13		 My	 telling	 you	 that	 p	 signals	 that	 I	 am	meeting	 your	 epistemic	 needs	 because	 it	would	violate	various	implicit	norms	of	interpretive	charity	and	conversational	implicature																																																																					10	Raz,	The	Morality	of	Freedom,	pp.	58ff.	11	 See	 Edward	 S.	 Hinchman,	 “Telling	 as	 Inviting	 to	 Trust,”	 Philosophy	 and	 Phenomenological	 Research	 70	(2005):	 pp.	 562-587;	 Paul	 Faulkner,	 “On	 Telling	 and	 Trusting,”	Mind	 116	 (2007):	 pp.	 875-902;	 Miranda	Fricker,	 “Group	Testimony?	The	Making	of	A	Collective	Good	 Informant,”	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	
Research	 84	 (2012):	 pp.	 249-276.	 To	 be	 clear,	 the	 relational	 conception	 of	 authority	 does	 not	 depend	 on	accepting	assurance	views	of	testimony.	Further,	my	account	is	not	intended	to	capture	theoretical	authority.	While	I	am	open	to	that	possibility,	it	goes	beyond	the	scope	of	this	article,	especially	because	issues	of	duty,	vulnerability,	and	autonomy	are	different	in	the	epistemic	context.		12	For	a	similar	analysis	of	promising,	relying	on	implicit	claims	and	signals,	see	T.	M.	Scanlon,	What	We	Owe	
to	Each	Other	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	1998),	pp.	306-7.		13	Hinchman,	p.	564.	
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for	me	to	utter	p	in	a	social	condition	where	you	require	information	without	my	utterance	being	 intended	to	meet	your	need.	 If	 I	uttered	p	as	a	 joke,	or	simply	as	stating	a	random	fact,	 it	would	be	 inappropriate.	 Since	my	utterance	 is	 directed	 at	 you	 in	 the	 face	of	 your	need	without	mitigating	presentation	 like	 laughter,	 I	am	appropriately	 taken	as	signaling	that	 this	 information	 responds	 to	 your	 need.	 I	 similarly	 signal	 my	 assurance	 that	 the	information	 is	accurate	because	 I	do	not	qualify	my	assertion,	 for	example	by	stating	my	own	doubts	about	 the	 information.	The	nature	of	 testimony	 is	 revealed	by	 looking	at	 the	signals	and	implicit	claims	that	any	act	of	telling	to	involves.			 Just	as	 testimony	 is	a	 relational	act	of	 telling	 to,	 commanding	 is	a	 relational	act	of	
demanding	 practical	 deference	 from.14	 If	we	only	 look	 at	 the	 conditions	under	which	 it	 is	rational	 to	 defer,	 or	 when	 deference	 is	 consistent	 with	 autonomy,	 we	 miss	 something	important	about	authority.	It	 is	often	rational	to	defer	to	a	person	who	does	not	have	the	standing	 to	demand	deference	 from	us.	Thus	 looking	at	 the	 relationship	 itself	 informs	us	about	the	nature	of	authority	in	a	way	that	asking	only	about	responding	to	reasons	in	the	abstract	does	not.	The	task	of	this	section	is	to	unpack	the	actual	act	of	demanding	another	person	defer	to	you.			 The	first	question	is	what	it	means	to	defer	in	this	context.	Deferring	clearly	involves	doing	 what	 was	 demanded,	 but	 this	 is	 not	 quite	 enough.	 Due	 to	 their	 illocutionary	 and	content-independent	character,	commands	are	not	just	directives	to	act	in	some	way;	they	are	 directives	 to	 act	 in	 some	 way	 because	 the	 commander	 said	 so.	 When	 one	 person	exercises	practical	authority	over	another,	they	demand	deference	not	to	the	command	but	to	 the	 commander.	 This	 is	 not	 deference	 to	 a	 good	 source	 of	 information	 or	 an	 abstract	reason,	but	the	relational	deference	of	one	person	to	another.			 In	 this	 section	 I	 identify	 and	 discuss	 four	 salient	 points	 of	 interest	 to	 more	 fully	characterize	this	sort	of	relationship.	First,	an	authority’s	demand	for	deference	is	made	on	the	 basis	 of	 the	 subject’s	 reasons.	 Second,	 any	 relationship	 of	 deference	 is	 hierarchical.	Third,	 when	 a	 subject	 defers	 to	 an	 authority	 she	 makes	 herself	 vulnerable.	 Fourth,	demanding	deference	signals	that	the	deference	is	appropriate.	For	the	sake	of	discussion	I	separate	these	out	conceptually,	but	they	are	interwoven	in	a	variety	of	important	ways.			
A.	Reasons		First,	 authority	 is	 exercised	within	 the	 space	 of	 reasons:	 commanding	 someone	 to	 act	 is	clearly	 not	 identical	 to	 physically	 forcing	 them	 to	 act	 or	 threatening	 them.	 Instead,	commands	claim	that	the	subject	has	conclusive	reason	to	act	in	some	way.	Further,	as	Raz	has	 argued,	 authority	 is	 based	 on	 the	 subject’s	 reasons	 (which	 go	 beyond	 narrow	 self-																																																																				14	Having	the	standing	to	demand	deference	 from	does	not	entail	 that	deference	 is	owed	to	 the	authority;	 I	deny	the	“directionality	thesis.”	See	Andrei	Marmor,	“An	Institutional	Conception	of	Authority,”	Philosophy	&	
Public	Affairs	39	(2011):	pp.	238-261,	at	pp.	255-60.	
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interest).15	Someone	who	issues	commands	for	her	own	benefit	and	without	consideration	of	her	purported	subjects	necessarily	lacks	authority	over	them.	Because	commands	make	claims	about	 subjects’	 reasons,	 issuing	a	 command	establishes	a	 certain	kind	of	 “positive	ethical	relationship,”	in	Miranda	Fricker’s	terms.16	The	ethical	value	present	is	the	value	of	one	 person	 bending	 their	 attention,	 judgment,	 and	 will	 to	 the	 context	 of	 another	 and	engaging	the	other	in	the	space	of	her	reasons.		Discussions	 of	 authority	 tend	 to	 stress	 the	 disvalue	 of	 authority	 relationships,	especially	 the	 subject’s	 presumptive	 loss	 of	 autonomy.	 This	 matters	 for	 justifying	 such	relationships	but	 their	positive	value	matters	 for	 accurately	 characterizing	and	 justifying	them	 as	 well.	 Raz	 rightly	 points	 out	 that	 as	 practical	 reasoners,	 subjects	 should	 often	welcome	others’	directives	because	those	directives	help	subjects	conform	better	to	their	reasons.	 Here	 we	 go	 beyond	 that.	 Initiating	 a	 relationship	 where	 one	 person	 engages	another	in	her	context	and	at	the	level	of	her	reasons	has	value,	as	does	responding	to	such	engagement—which	we	will	see	more	clearly	below	in	the	context	of	vulnerability.		
B.	Hierarchy		The	next	noteworthy	characteristic	is	somewhat	obvious	but	important	to	make	explicit:	a	relationship	 of	 deference	 is	 necessarily	 hierarchical	 in	 nature.	 The	 hierarchy	 between	authority	and	subject	has	been	implicit	throughout	the	discussion	so	far.	It	includes	the	two	complementary	 elements	 of	 superiority	 and	 inferiority.	 When	 an	 authority	 issues	 a	command	to	a	subject,	the	command	signals	that	the	authority	is	in	a	superior	position	and	the	subject	is	in	an	inferior	position.	While	the	signal	of	inferiority	is	the	more	worrisome	of	the	two,	both	elements	require	explanation.		The	 hierarchy	 is	 especially	 pressing	 because	 commands	 invoke	 the	 subject’s	 own	reasons.	How	 can	 the	 subject	 be	 inferior	with	 respect	 to	 her	 own	 reasons?	How	 can	 the	authority	be	superior	with	respect	to	someone	else’s	reasons?	Issuing	a	command	not	only	sends	these	signals,	it	gives	them	practical	import	by	demanding	deference	on	the	basis	of	the	subject’s	inferior	status	in	relation	to	her	own	reasons.		There	are	two	distinct	but	related	issues	here.17	The	first	concerns	control	over	one’s	own	 actions	 and	 responses	 to	 reasons:	 an	 essential	 part	 of	 self-determination	 is	 the	standing	to	prioritize	reasons	and	my	responses	to	them.	This	matters	for	which	people	I	choose	to	be	friends	with,	my	family	life,	my	choice	of	profession,	and	so	on.	The	other	issue	is	about	knowledge	of	my	reasons.	These	are	distinct:	we	might	agree	about	what	reasons	I	have	but	disagree	about	who	gets	to	determine	how	I	act	in	response	to	those	reasons.																																																																						15	Raz,	The	Morality	of	Freedom,	pp.	47-48.	16	 Fricker,	 p.	 252.	 The	 value	 of	 such	 a	 relationship	 may	 be	 utterly	 swamped	 by	 other	 considerations	 in	particular	contexts.	17	Thanks	to	two	anonymous	reviewers	for	pushing	me	here.	
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Authorities	claim	superiority	of	both	kinds:	regardless	of	whether	the	subject	thinks	she	has	better	judged	the	reasons	that	apply	to	her	and	regardless	of	whether	she	believes	she	 should	 be	 the	 one	 to	 determine	 how	 to	 act,	 the	 authority	 claims	 to	 override	 her.	Authority	comes	along	with	a	claim	not	only	of	conformity	but	deference:	you	should	not	only	act	in	some	way,	you	should	do	so	because	you	were	told	to.	It	is	not	only	the	affront	of	other-determination,	it	is	other-determination	on	the	seemingly	paternalistic	grounds	that	deference	is	best	on	the	basis	of	the	subject’s	own	reasons.	Consider	 the	 sort	 of	 affront	 that	 appropriately	 follows	 from	 an	 unwarranted	command.	For	example,	sometimes	strangers	will	approach	cigarette	smokers	on	the	street	and	say,	“Stop	smoking!”	A	common	response	is	something	like	“Just	who	do	you	think	you	are?”	The	strangers	signal	that	the	smoker	is	 inferior,	either	lacking	common	information	or	 lacking	 the	 standing	 to	 decide	 for	 herself.	 This	 naturally	 leads	 to	 affront.	 Passing	strangers	 do	 not	 stand	 in	 the	 right	 relationship	 to	 be	 able	 to	 order	 others	 around	 and	signaling	the	hierarchy	implicit	in	command	is	inappropriate	in	such	circumstances.		
C.	Vulnerability		Deference	 of	 any	 sort	 makes	 the	 deferrer	 vulnerable	 to	 the	 deferree,	 meaning	 that	 the	deferrer’s	 interests	 can	 be	 set	 back	 by	 the	 deferree’s	 choices.	 The	 importance	 of	 these	interests	and	so	the	degree	of	vulnerability	varies	widely	across	contexts.	A	soldier	obeying	a	command	to	fight,	kill,	and	possibly	die	becomes	vulnerable	in	excruciating,	fundamental	ways	 whereas	 an	 employee	 obeying	 an	 order	 to	 attend	 a	 meeting	 becomes	 vulnerable	much	more	tenuously.	Of	course	we	are	all	vulnerable	to	others	in	a	wide	variety	of	ways.	The	vulnerability	of	subject	to	authority	is	of	a	particular	kind.		One	way	we	can	be	vulnerable	 to	others	 is	when	we	merely	rely	on	them.	Merely	relying	 on	 someone	 can	 be	 done	without	 their	 knowledge	 and	without	 any	 judgment	 of	their	 character.	 Kant’s	 neighbors	 may	 have	 relied	 on	 his	 daily	 walk	 to	 schedule	 their	routines.18	They	do	so	based	on	their	assessment	of	his	regularity;	Kant	does	not	know	that	they	 rely	 on	 him.	 Still,	 they	 are	 vulnerable	 to	 Kant	 because	 their	 own	 schedule	may	 be	upset	if	Kant	fails	to	take	his	walk	one	day.	The	vulnerability	of	subject	to	authority	is	much	more	robust	than	this.	First,	recall	the	 reflexive	 intention	 that	 is	 intrinsic	 to	 command.	 Commands	 depend	 on	 mutual	knowledge	of	the	relationship	between	authority	and	subject	because	they	depend	on	each	party	recognizing	the	authority’s	intention	to	bind	in	order	to	succeed.	Unlike	in	the	Kant	case,	 both	 parties	 know	 that	 the	 subject	 is	 vulnerable	 to	 the	 authority.	 Further,	 the	authority	demands	that	the	subject	make	herself	vulnerable.			 Both	 the	 mutual	 recognition	 of	 the	 subject’s	 vulnerability	 and	 the	 demand	 for																																																																					18	For	this	case,	see	Annette	Baier,	“Trust	and	Antitrust,”	Ethics	(1986):		pp.	231-260	at	p.	235.	
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vulnerability	 shape	 the	 relationship	 between	 authority	 and	 subject.	 Knowledge	 that	someone	else	is	vulnerable	to	you	changes	how	you	should	act.	For	example,	if	Kant	knew	that	others	depended	on	the	regularity	of	his	walks,	it	would	be	reasonable	for	him	to	take	a	variety	of	new	precautions	to	ensure	regularity.	The	practical	context	of	others	depending	on	his	walks	is	different	from	the	context	of	his	walks	just	being	a	personal	part	of	his	daily	routine.	If	he	(oddly)	demands	that	they	depend	on	his	walks,	then	he	should	be	especially	rigorous	in	his	schedule,	should	inform	them	if	he	will	be	off	schedule,	and	so	on.	Because	commands	 demand	 vulnerability,	 they	 commit	 the	 commander	 to	 recognizing	 and	
accounting	 for	 the	 subject’s	 vulnerability.	 As	 Annette	 Baier,	 Fricker,	 and	 others	 have	emphasized,	we	 can	 see	 this	by	 considering	 the	 appropriate	 response	 to	 failures:	 if	Kant	demands	reliance	and	then	fails	to	keep	his	schedule,	blame	and	feelings	of	betrayal	are	apt,	while	they	would	not	be	in	the	unknown	reliance	case.	The	fact	that	commands	involve	mutually	recognized	vulnerability	shows	how	much	it	matters	that	deferring	to	authority	is	not	just	deference	to	an	abstract	source	of	reasons	but	to	another	person.	When	obeying	an	authority,	subjects	rely	on	another’s	judgment	and	
character.19	When	 you	 defer	 to	 a	 command,	 you	 depend	 on	 the	 authority	 in	 a	 variety	 of	ways:	 you	 depend	 on	 their	 judgment	 regarding	 your	 reasons,	 on	 their	 ability	 and	willingness	 to	 act	 for	 those	 reasons,	 on	 their	 commitment	 to	 your	 autonomy	 and	 to	 the	importance	 of	 not	 commanding	 unless	 necessary,	 and	 perhaps	 most	 importantly	 you	depend	on	their	understanding	of	your	vulnerability	and	their	unwillingness	to	exploit	that	vulnerability.	 Deferring	 to	 others	 creates	 a	 space	 where	 they	 can	 harm	 you	 at	 their	discretion,	so	involves	depending	on	their	conscientiousness,	honesty,	insight,	and	care.		This	all	means	 that	 the	vulnerability	of	subject	 to	authority	 is	especially	relational	and	personal:	when	one	person	defers	 to	another	 “a	deal	of	 trust	 is	 struck.”20	Such	deals	matter:	relations	of	trust	enable	and	partially	constitute	some	of	the	most	valuable	aspects	of	 our	 lives.	When	 the	deal	 is	 struck,	 the	 subject	 signals	 that	 the	 authority	 is	 sufficiently	trustworthy	to	defer	to,	makes	herself	vulnerable	to	the	authority,	the	authority	accepts	the	vulnerability	that	was	demanded,	and	signals	that	the	subject	was	correct	to	defer.21	This	is	why	 betrayal	 is	 an	 apt	 response	 to	 the	 abuse	 and	misuse	 of	 authority.	 By	 deferring	 the	subject	created	a	space	where	she	could	be	harmed	by	the	authority,	the	authority	accepted	the	 subject’s	 deference	 in	 full	 knowledge	 of	 that	 space,	 and	 in	 the	 end	 the	 subject	 was	harmed.	The	deal	of	trust	was	broken.																																																																							19	Cf.	John	Hardwig,	“The	Role	of	Trust	in	Knowledge,”	The	Journal	of	Philosophy	88	(1991):	pp.		693-708	at	p.	700.	20	Fricker,	p.	257.	Cf.	Joseph	Raz,	“Government	by	Consent,”	in	Ethics	and	the	Public	Domain	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1995):	pp.	355-369	at	p.	367.		21	The	authority	is	also	made	vulnerable	to	the	subject,	albeit	in	a	notably	weaker	way,	because	her	reputation	is	on	the	line,	her	standing	as	a	commander	and	her	trustworthiness	are	put	to	the	test,	and	so	on.		
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D.	Appropriateness		Finally,	the	command’s	demand	for	deference	signals	that	the	deference	is	appropriate.	One	way	 of	 bringing	 out	 the	 strength	 of	 this	 signal	 is	 to	 contrast	 it	with	 the	 testimony	 case:	testimony	is	an	invitation	to	trust	the	testifier.	The	ultimate	goal	is	for	that	invitation	to	be	accepted,	but	it	is	still	just	an	invitation,	so	is	open	for	the	recipient	to	accept	or	reject.	This	is	 akin	 to	 advice	 in	 the	practical	 case.	When	 I	 advise	 you	 to	 act	 in	 some	way,	 I	 certainly	signal	 that	 I	 think	 this	 is	 the	appropriate	way	 to	act,	but	 I	 am	still	 simply	 inviting	you	 to	accept	my	advice.	The	ultimate	standard	of	appropriateness	is	your	own.	Commands	 are	 different	 because	 they	 demand	 deference.	 Not	 only	 do	 commands	signal	that	deference	is	appropriate,	they	specifically	signal	that	the	appropriateness	holds	regardless	of	whether	 the	 subject	 agrees	with	 that	 assessment.	Commands	do	not	 invite,	commands	impose.	If	a	subordinate	soldier	questions	whether	a	command	is	appropriate,	the	 commander’s	 judgment	 of	 appropriateness	 simply	 overrides	 the	 subordinate’s.22	Further,	the	command	is	a	content-independent	reason,	so	the	appropriateness	is	based	on	the	qualities	of	the	commander	rather	than	on	the	quality	of	the	content	of	the	command.		Commands	signal	that	all	the	distinctive	aspects	of	the	relationship	of	authority	are	appropriate:	 that	 the	 subject	 really	 does	 have	 conclusive	 reason	 to	 act	 in	 the	 way	commanded,	 that	 they	 should	 defer	 and	 thereby	 make	 themselves	 vulnerable,	 that	 the	subject	 is	 an	 inferior	 position,	 that	 the	 authority	 is	 in	 a	 superior	 position	 and	 has	 the	standing	to	accept	the	subject’s	vulnerability,	that	the	deal	of	trust	should	be	struck,	and	so	on.	 The	 most	 important	 implication	 of	 this	 signal	 is	 that	 the	 commander	 thereby	 takes	
responsibility	for	the	appropriateness	of	the	relationship	and	its	results.	It	 is	 the	 commander	 who	makes	 the	 initial	 demand	 and	 signals	 appropriateness,	taking	 the	weight	 and	 implications	 of	 the	 relationship	 onto	herself.	When	 I	 demand	 that	you	do	as	I	say,	I	put	you	on	a	path	that	you	otherwise	might	not	have	embarked	on	and	I	rule	out	all	other	paths.	In	an	important	sense	you	have	become	an	extension	of	my	will	and	my	 understanding	 of	 how	 the	 world	 should	 be.	 I	 become	 responsible	 for	 your	 actions	because	I	impose	the	relationship	that	led	to	your	actions	in	the	first	place.	This	contrasts	with	 the	 case	 of	 advice,	 where	 you	 might	 blame	 me	 for	 bad	 advice,	 but	 the	 ultimate	responsibility	 is	 with	 you	 for	 accepting	 and	 acting	 on	 my	 advice	 in	 light	 of	 your	 own	judgment	of	its	quality.	Our	practices	of	authority	 reflect	 the	 fact	 that	authorities	accept	 responsibility	 for	their	 subjects’	 actions	 and	 the	 consequences	 of	 their	 commands.23	Military	 commanders	are	 blamed	 for	 their	 units’	 failures	 and	 praised	 for	 successes,	 coaches	 are	 credited	with	their	 teams’	wins,	and	so	on.	This	 is	because	 their	 subordinates	and	players	are	carrying	out	 the	will	 of	 the	 commander	 by	 obeying	 the	 commander’s	 directives.	 The	 commander																																																																					22	On	the	necessary	limitations	of	this	claim,	see	Raz,	The	Morality	of	Freedom,	p.	62.	23	Responsibility	is	not	zero-sum,	so	this	doesn’t	entail	that	deference	makes	subjects	less	responsible.		
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signaled	the	appropriateness	of	their	subjects	deferring	and	acting	in	the	way	commanded,	so	takes	responsibility	for	their	deference	and	its	results.	This	goes	overlooked	if	we	focus	on	the	rationality	of	subjects’	deference	rather	than	on	the	mutual	relationship	that	obtains	when	a	command	is	issued.			 III.	Four	Conditions			The	 relational	 analysis	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 act	 of	 demanding	 deference	 from	 another	person	 establishes	 a	 relationship	 of	 hierarchy,	 vulnerability,	 and	 responsibility.	 These	elements	 are	 built	 into	 the	 nature	 of	 authority:	 authority	 is	 the	 power	 to	 command	 and	commanding	 initiates	 and	 depends	 upon	 this	 kind	 of	 relationship.	 The	 relational	conception	of	authority,	then,	asks	under	what	conditions	such	a	relationship	is	justified.	In	this	 section	 I	 argue	 for	 four	 individually	 necessary	 and	 jointly	 sufficient	 conditions	 on	authority	by	showing	that	the	authority	relationship	is	objectionable	in	the	absence	of	each.			
A.	Duty		Issuing	 a	 command	 signals	 that	 the	 subject	 is	 inferior	 specifically	 with	 respect	 to	 their	reasons.	 Further,	 the	 signal	 is	 that	 they	 are	 so	 inferior	 that	 they	 should	 defer	 to	 the	authority’s	 judgment	 just	 because	 the	 authority	 said	 so.	 How	 could	 such	 a	 signal	 be	appropriate?	What	would	explain	standing	is	such	a	relation	to	another	person?	The	most	significant	obstacles	to	such	relations	are	our	rights	to	autonomy	and	self-determination,	which	entail	 that	we	generally	have	 the	right	 to	choose	how	to	act	within	specific	bounds.	We	get	to	choose	how	to	live	our	lives	without	interference,	including	how	to	balance	and	prioritize	our	 reasons,	 so	we	are	aptly	 affronted	when	others	 arrogate	 to	themselves	the	power	to	unilaterally	interfere	in	such	choices.	Since	we	have	a	right	to	self-determination	ceteris	paribus,	 the	relationship	of	authority	does	not	usually	obtain.	There	needs	 to	 be	 some	 morally	 weighty	 consideration	 that	 could	 defeat	 that	 right	 to	 self-determination.	This	brings	me	to	the	first	condition	on	genuine	authority:			
the	duty	condition:	a	person	can	have	authority	over	another	only	when	the	potential	subject	is	under	a	preexisting	duty,	the	fulfillment	of	which	defeats	standing	rights	to	self-determination.			The	latter	clause	recognizes	the	possibility	that	it’s	not	the	case	that	any	duty	whatsoever	could	 ground	 authority.	 Some	 moral	 duties	 are	 relatively	 minor	 and	 some	 can	 only	 be	fulfilled	 by	 self-direction;	 such	 duties	 will	 not	 defeat	 the	 standing	 right	 to	 self-determination.				 Imagine	that	the	duty	condition	is	not	met.	If	the	subject	is	not	under	a	duty	to	act	(or	not	under	a	sufficiently	stringent	duty),	then	her	right	to	self-determination	holds	sway	
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and	she	should	be	able	to	choose	how	to	 live	her	 life	 for	herself.	 In	general,	 if	 there	 is	no	preexisting	duty,	then	there	is	nothing	important	enough	to	justify	another	person	being	in	the	 position	 to	 demand	 that	 she	 act	 in	 any	 specific	 way,	 so	 nobody	 can	 have	 genuine	authority	over	her.	Equality	defines	our	default	relationships	with	others;	the	relationship	of	deference	and	hierarchy	demands	special	justification.	This	results	in	a	picture	of	authority	according	to	which	someone	only	has	authority	for	 the	 purpose	 of	 others	 meeting	 their	 preexisting	 duties.	 In	 this	 way	 it	 is	 clearly	instrumentalist:	 authority’s	 purpose	 or	 role	 is	 to	 help	 subjects	 fulfill	 their	 duties	 (and	correlatively	respect	others’	rights).24	That	said,	the	instrumentalist	role	of	authority	on	the	relational	conception	is	significantly	more	limited	than	on	Raz’s	service	conception,	where	authority	 helps	 subjects	 conform	 better	 to	 reason	 generally.	 Practical	 reasons	 are	ubiquitous	 for	 rational	 agents	 like	 ourselves,	 and	 so	 the	 service	 conception	 appears	 to	license	ubiquitous	authority	as	well;	but	authority	does	not	seem	to	extend	in	the	ways	this	implies.	This	 is	 the	 foundation	of	many	objections	 to	 the	service	conception,	 for	example	grounding	worries	that	we	will	be	subject	to	the	authority	of	reliable	computers,	personal	trainers,	 cooking	 instructors,	 financial	 advisors,	 and	 perhaps	 even	 anyone	 slightly	wiser	than	us.25			Raz	 does	 importantly	 limit	 the	 scope	 of	 authority	 with	 what	 he	 calls	 the	independence	 condition,	 according	 to	which	 authority	 only	 obtains	when	 “it	 is	 better	 to	conform	to	 reason	 than	 to	decide	 for	oneself.”26	While	Raz	argues	 that	 the	 independence	condition	 is	 an	 important	 constraint	 on	 authority,	 he	 is	 still	 concerned	with	 the	 broader	question	 of	 responding	well	 to	 reasons	 and	 does	 not	 claim	 authority	 is	 limited	 to	 duty-fulfillment.	He	revealingly	writes,	“the	desirability	of	deciding	for	oneself,	independently	of	authority,	is	a	major	enhancer	and	qualifier	of	the	scope	of	authority.”27		In	 contrast,	 on	my	 view	 authority	 concerns	when	 one	 has	 the	 right	 to	 decide	 for	oneself,	not	when	deciding	for	oneself	is	merely	desirable.	Raz	mentions	a	case	where	you	are	 unsure	 of	 your	 own	 judgment	 and	 so	 looking	 to	 another	 for	 guidance	 is	 desirable.	According	to	the	service	conception	a	subject	may	well	be	under	genuine	authority	in	such	cases,	 but	not	 according	 to	 the	 relational	 conception.	 It	may	be	desirable	 to	 let	 someone																																																																					24	This	doesn’t	entail	that	the	purpose	of	authority	is	to	maximize	duty-fulfillment.	25	See	Perry,	pp.	47,	49;	Shapiro,	pp.	417,	423;	Darwall,	“Authority	and	Second-Personal	Reasons	for	Acting,”	pp.	 147-148;	 Stephen	 Darwall,	 “Authority	 and	 Reasons:	 Exclusionary	 and	 Second-Personal,”	 Ethics	 120	(2010):	pp.	257-278	at	p.	258;	Kenneth	Einar	Himma,	“Just	‘Cause	You’re	Smarter	than	Me	Doesn’t	Give	You	a	Right	to	Tell	Me	What	to	Do:	Legitimate	Authority	and	the	Normal	Justification	Thesis,”	Oxford	Journal	of	Legal	
Studies	27	(2007):	pp.	121-150.	26	 Joseph	 Raz,	 “The	 Problem	 of	 Authority:	 Revisiting	 the	 Service	 Conception”,	Minnesota	 Law	 Review	 90	(2006):	pp.	1003-1044	at	p.	1014;	also	see	The	Morality	of	Freedom,	p.	69.		27	Joseph	Raz,	“Comments	and	Responses,”	in	Lukas	H.	Meyer,	Stanley	L.	Paulson,	and	Thomas	W.	Pogge	(eds.)	
Rights,	 Culture,	 and	 the	 Law:	 Themes	 from	 the	 Legal	 and	 Political	 Philosophy	 of	 Joseph	 Raz	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	University	Press,	2003):	pp.	253-273,	at	p.	261.	
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else	decide,	and	rational	to	do	so,	but	on	my	view	you	cannot	be	under	authority	because	you	 are	 not	 under	 any	 preexisting	 duty—which	 is	 why	 personal	 trainers	 and	 cooking	instructors	lack	practical	authority.	The	rationality	or	desirability	of	deferring	to	someone	is	distinct	from	whether	they	have	the	power	to	demand	deference	from	you.28		Similar	thoughts	about	desirability	and	rights	apply	in	other	contexts.	Your	property	rights	constrain	others’	actions	even	when	it	is	desirable	or	somehow	rational	to	let	them	act.	It	might	be	desirable	to	let	an	interior	designer	into	your	home	to	decorate,	yet	they	are	only	 permitted	 to	 do	 so	 if	 you	 allow	 it.	 The	 desirability	 is	 distinct	 from	 the	 question	 of	whether	they	have	the	standing	to	unilaterally	do	what	is	desirable.		Two	 further	 clarifications:	 first,	 as	 part	 of	 my	 attempt	 to	 provide	 a	 relatively	ecumenical	 theory	of	practical	authority,	 I	 leave	open	 the	particular	account	of	duty.	The	relational	 conception	 shows	 what	 considerations	 must	 be	 balanced	 to	 understand	authority,	but	many	comprehensive	value	theories	could	employ	it.	Plausibly	what	matters	is	that	there	can	only	be	genuine	authority	when	some	significantly	important	interests	of	others	are	at	 stake,	which	ground	very	weighty,	presumptively	binding	 reasons	 for	us	 to	respect	those	interests.	Only	duties	could	override	the	significant	interests	we	have	in	self-determination,	which	 ground	our	 standing	 immunity	 against	 others	having	 the	power	 to	command	us.		Our	final	view	about	the	scope	and	shape	of	genuine	authority	will	in	large	part	be	determined	 by	 our	 view	 about	 the	 relevant	 duties,	 including	 how	 stringent	 they	 are,	 to	what	extent	we	owe	positive	duties	of	aid	to	others,	and	so	on.	Included	in	this	will	be	our	understanding	 of	 autonomy	 or	 self-determination	 and	 its	 importance	 relative	 to	 other	grounds	of	duties.	This	affects	the	latter	clause	of	the	duty	condition;	the	more	important	you	think	autonomy	is,	the	fewer	duties	will	be	sufficiently	important	to	override	it.	Robert	Paul	Wolff’s	 anarchist	 argument	 could	 be	 interpreted	 as	 the	 end	 point	 of	 this	 spectrum,	according	to	which	deference	is	conceptually	heteronomous.29		Second,	 the	 duty	 condition	 is	 quite	 flexible.	 Below	 I	 use	 the	 example	 of	 an	emergency	duty	of	aid	but	many	other	relevant	kinds	of	duties	have	significantly	different	implications	 for	 authority.	 Two	 interesting	 examples:	 first,	 a	 Rawlsian	 natural	 duty	 of	justice	to	establish	and	maintain	the	basic	structure	of	society	is	a	life-long	and	pervasive	duty	that	has	drastic	implications	for	the	possibility	of	genuine	political	authority.30	This	is	not	like	a	temporary	duty	of	aid,	but	a	duty	that	may	justify	intergenerational	institutions	of	authority.	Second,	the	duty	condition	can	be	met	by	a	duty	created	with	an	act	of	consent.	This	is	particularly	relevant	for	many	of	the	practices	of	authority	in	our	daily	lives	that	are	based	on	contracts,	 like	those	in	an	employment	context.	Consent	is	a	somewhat	artificial	way	to	fulfill	the	duty	condition:	insofar	as	your	employer	has	authority,	it	is	not	based	on																																																																					28	Cf.	Perry,	p.	42	and	A.	John	Simmons,	Boundaries	of	Authority	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2016),	p.	26.	29	Robert	Paul	Wolff,	In	Defense	of	Anarchism	(New	York:	Harper	&	Row,	1970).	30	John	Rawls,	A	Theory	of	Justice	rev.	ed.	(Cambridge:	Harvard	UP,	1999),	pp.	293-94.	
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some	separate	duty	(e.g.	a	duty	to	be	maximally	productive)	but	on	the	duty	you	create	to	abide	by	the	terms	you	consented	to.			
B.	Precedence		So	 the	 subject	 has	 a	 particularly	 important	 kind	 of	 duty,	 the	 sort	 that	 could	 potentially	justify	deference.	Call	 it	 the	 “grounding”	duty.	The	grounding	duty	only	captures	 the	 first	step	in	the	possibility	of	justified	deference	and	the	hierarchy	that	such	deference	entails.	It	does	 not	 yet	 explain	 why	 the	 subject	 is	 inferior	 with	 respect	 to	 these	 reasons	 in	 this	particular	 case	 or	 why	 the	 authority	 is	 superior.	 The	 duty	 condition	 establishes	 that	deference	may	be	required	in	a	particular	class	of	cases	but	we	still	need	to	explain	why	the	subject	should	defer	to	a	specific	other	person.	This	leads	us	to	our	second	condition:		
the	 precedence	 condition:	 a	 person	 can	 have	 authority	 over	 another	 only	when	 the	 potential	 subject	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 fulfill	 her	 grounding	 duty	 by	following	 the	 potential	 authority’s	 commands	 than	 by	 following	 her	 own	judgment.			When	 the	 authority’s	 commands	 are	 likely	 superior	 for	 the	 relevant	 purposes,	 her	commands	take	precedence	over	the	subject’s	judgment.	(This	essentially	amounts	to	Raz’s	normal	justification	thesis.)	A	variety	of	considerations	can	fulfill	the	precedence	condition,	including	expertise,	perspective,	and	coordination.			 Consider	the	following	case:	hiking	with	your	doctor	friend	in	the	forest	far	beyond	the	 range	of	phone	 service	or	 friendly	outposts,	 you	discover	 some	critically	 injured	and	unconscious	 hikers.	 The	motivating	 idea	 behind	 the	 precedence	 condition	 is	 that	 as	 you	assist	 the	 hikers	 you	 should	 defer	 to	 your	 friend	 because	 her	 medical	 judgment	 is	 so	superior	to	yours,	given	her	expertise	(without	considering	yet	whether	she	has	authority).	Not	only	should	you	defer,	it	is	appropriate	for	her	to	signal	the	superiority	of	her	judgment	and	the	relative	inferiority	of	your	judgment.	You	have	an	urgent	task	to	perform	and	this	is	not	the	time	for	a	friendly	debate	about	the	relative	merits	of	various	medical	treatments,	especially	not	between	expert	and	novice.			 Imagine	 that	 the	precedence	condition	 is	not	met,	 as	when	your	hiking	 friend	 is	a	medical	novice	like	you.	In	that	case	it	would	be	odd	to	think	that	you	should	defer	to	them	precisely	 because	 following	 their	 commands	 is	 no	 more	 likely	 to	 help	 the	 hikers	 than	following	your	own	 judgment	 is.	You	still	need	 to	 coordinate	but	neither	of	you	 is	 in	 the	place	to	initiate	a	relationship	of	authority:	to	demand	deference	from	the	other,	to	signal	superiority	and	inferiority,	and	to	take	the	weight	of	the	hikers’	lives	on	your	will.			 Authority	in	an	emergency	is	quite	different	from	other	kinds	of	authority.	Political	authority,	 for	 example,	 is	 generally	 claimed	 over	 wide	 swaths	 of	 activities	 and	 over	 the	entire	course	of	subjects’	 lives.	The	precedence	condition	will	be	much	harder	to	meet	 in	
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such	 cases,	 wherein	 commands	 signal	 a	 much	 more	 wide-ranging	 and	 fundamental	relationship	 of	 hierarchy	 and	 have	 significant	 implications	 for	 subjects’	 standing	 as	 self-determining	 persons.	 But	 this	 is	 what	 we	 should	 expect.	 The	 broader	 the	 scope	 of	 an	authority’s	jurisdiction,	the	less	room	for	subjects	to	choose	for	themselves,	so	the	heavier	the	justificatory	burden.		
C.	Acceptance		The	 duty	 and	 precedence	 conditions	 account	 for	 appropriate	 hierarchical	 signals	 in	 the	space	of	reasons.	The	final	two	conditions	capture	the	crucial	aspect	of	mutually	recognized	and	 unilaterally	 demanded	 vulnerability.	 We	 first	 focus	 on	 the	 standing	 to	 demand	vulnerability.			 Recall	 the	 deal	 of	 trust:	 authorities	 are	 aware	 that	 they	 demand	 deference	 and	vulnerability	 from	 subjects,	 subjects	 recognize	 that	 demand,	 and	 subjects	 accede	 to	 the	demand	 specifically	 on	 the	 word	 of	 the	 authority.	 In	 order	 for	 this	 to	 be	 justified,	 the	authority	must	recognize	and	respect	the	subject’s	vulnerability	and	the	expression	of	trust	that	deference	entails.	The	authority	recognizes	the	trust	put	in	her	and	recognizes	the	fact	that	she	signaled	the	appropriateness	of	that	trust	 in	the	first	place.	For	all	 these	reasons	the	 authority	must	 account	 for	 the	 relationship	 of	 vulnerability	 in	 her	 actions	 by	 taking	responsibility	 for	 the	 command	 and	 its	 consequences,	 including	 but	 not	 limited	 to	 the	consequences	on	the	subject	herself.	From	this	we	get	the	third	condition:		
the	 acceptance	 condition:	 a	 person	 can	 have	 authority	 over	 another	 only	when	the	potential	authority	understands	and	accepts	that	she	has	authority	and	the	accompanying	responsibility	of	command.		I	lack	authority	over	you	if	I	do	not	appreciate	the	gravity	of	issuing	commands	to	you	and	expecting	you	to	carry	out	my	will	in	the	world.	In	that	case	I	do	not	have	the	standing	to	demand	deference	from	you	and	you	are	not	subject	to	my	will	(even	if	you	have	reason	to	defer	to	me).		Imagine	 that	 the	 acceptance	 condition	 is	 not	 met.	 Genuine	 authority	 without	 the	acceptance	condition	would	entail	that	one	person	could	justifiably	demand	deference	and	vulnerability	 from	another	without	any	recognition	of	 the	costs	of	her	commands	 for	her	subjects	 or	 the	 gravity	 of	 the	 relationship	 she	 is	 initiating.	 She	would	not	 appreciate	 the	trust	 put	 in	 her	 and	 would	 not	 take	 account	 of	 the	 subject’s	 vulnerability	 in	 her	deliberations	about	how	to	exercise,	and	not	exercise,	her	authority.	In	not	understanding	the	 costs	 of	 deferring	 to	 an	 authority,	 she	 also	 does	 not	 understand	 the	 risks	 of	 abusing	authority	 by	 making	 inappropriate	 demands.	 The	 idea	 that	 she	 could	 have	 genuine	authority	in	such	conditions	undercuts	the	instrumentalist	role	of	authority	and	contradicts	our	 practices	 of	 authority,	wherein	 authorities	 take	 responsibility	 for	 their	 role	 and	 can	
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lose	their	authority	when	they	act	irresponsibly.	The	 acceptance	 condition	 is	 one	 of	 the	most	 distinctive	 elements	 of	 the	 relational	conception.	Discussions	of	authority	generally	focus	on	the	conflict	between	autonomy	and	authority,	 which	 is	 a	 conflict	 for	 subjects.	 As	 such	 the	 role	 of	 the	 authority	 has	 been	comparatively	 ignored.	What	 the	 relational	 analysis	 shows	 is	 that	 subjects	 defer	 in	 large	part	 because	 of	 authorities’	 commitments	 and	 signals	 that	 accompany	 any	 command,	importantly	 including	 the	 authority’s	 commitment	 to	 accept	 responsibility	 for	 the	relationship.31	 A	 social	 practice	 of	 authority	 that	 relied	 on	 subjects	 responding	 to	 an	authority’s	 implicit	 acceptance	 of	 responsibility	 but	 did	 not	 require	 the	 authority	 to	actually	accept	responsibility	would	be	unreasonable.	Two	 notable	 results:	 first,	 someone	 who	 was	 otherwise	 well	 placed	 to	 be	 an	authority	 might	 lack	 authority	 because	 she	 refuses	 to	 take	 responsibility.	 Second,	 the	acceptance	condition	emphasizes	that	authorities	need	some	understanding	of	the	nature	of	 command.	 In	 the	 injured	hikers	case	 the	potential	authority	at	 stake	 is	very	 limited	 in	both	scope	and	time	and	your	doctor	friend	presumably	recognizes	the	impermissibility	of	demanding	deference	 from	you	 in	normal	contexts.	But	 in	other	cases,	again	highlighting	the	 political	 case	where	 governments	 not	 only	 claim	 vast	 authority	 but	 set	 the	 limits	 of	their	own	authority	and	coercively	enforce	it,	 it	 is	 incredibly	important	that	governments	understand	 the	nature	of	authority	and	 its	 costs.	Agents	 that	do	not	 recognize	what	 is	at	stake	in	a	relationship	of	authority	cannot	stand	in	such	a	relationship	over	others	and	so	lack	genuine	authority.	This	 is	 true	 even	 if	 it	 would	 be	 good	 or	 required	 for	 subjects	 to	 defer	 to	 their	directives	 on	 other	 grounds	 and	 so	 the	 first	 two	 conditions	 were	 met.	 For	 example,	 a	government	 that	 does	 not	 recognize	 its	 responsibilities	 to	 citizens	 in	 issuing	 commands	lacks	 political	 authority.	 Citizens	may	 still	 be	 required	 to	 conform	 to	 particular	 laws,	 for	example	following	guidelines	on	the	storage	of	industrial	chemicals,	but	this	requirement	is	grounding	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 law	 is	 a	 good	 guide	 to	what	 counts	 as	 sufficiently	 secure	storage,	not	because	the	government	can	appropriately	demand	deference.	As	emphasized	above,	the	requirement	and	the	standing	to	impose	the	requirement	are	distinct.	There	 is	 a	 worry	 here,	 however.	 It	 may	 seem	 that,	 rather	 than	 a	 condition	 on	genuine	 authority,	 the	 acceptance	 condition	 describes	 something	 extraneous,	 such	 as	 a	duty	 of	 care	 or	 virtuous	 command.32	However,	many	 relationships—and	 the	 powers	 and	claims	conferred	by	being	in	such	relationships—are	contingent	on	the	acknowledgement	and	acceptance	of	various	rights	and	responsibilities.	The	powers	 that	parents	have	over	their	children	are	 in	part	contingent	on	accepting	a	duty	of	care;	 if	 the	parent	abuses	the	child	and	so	egregiously	fails	the	duty	of	care,	they	lose	the	powers	of	parenting.	We	think	such	powers	are	contingent	on	accepting	the	duty	of	care	due	to	the	interests	of	the	child,																																																																					31	Cf.	Scanlon,	p.	307.	32	Thanks	to	three	anonymous	reviewers	for	raising	this	issue.	
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the	nature	of	the	relationship,	and	how	we	understand	the	social	practice	of	parenting.	The	same	 is	 true	 of	 authority.	 Possessing	 the	 power	 to	 demand	 deference	 is	 contingent	 on	accepting	the	responsibilities	of	command	because	deference	requires	that	subjects	make	themselves	vulnerable.		In	 both	 the	 authority	 and	 parenting	 cases,	 the	minimal	 responsibility	 upon	which	possession	of	the	power	is	contingent	is	also	clearly	distinct	from	the	standards	defining	a	virtuous	relationship.	A	virtuous	parent	goes	far	beyond	refraining	from	neglect	or	abuse	and	 a	 virtuous	 authority	 would	 go	 beyond	 refraining	 from	 abusing	 her	 authority.	 The	acceptance	 condition	 marks	 out	 a	 minimal	 prerequisite	 for	 possession	 of	 authority,	 not	anything	more	robust.		
D.	Trustworthiness		Deferring	to	an	authority	makes	the	subject	vulnerable	to	the	authority	in	the	specific	sense	that	the	subject	takes	the	mere	fact	of	the	authority’s	say-so	as	a	binding	reason	to	act,	so	the	subject’s	interests	may	be	set	back	by	the	authority	choosing	to	direct	the	subject	in	one	way	rather	than	another.	Deference	involves	entrusting	one’s	interests	to	another.	In	order	for	 such	 an	 act	 to	 be	 justified,	 the	 person	 gaining	 control	 over	 the	 interests	 must	 be	sufficiently	 trustworthy,	 given	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 interests	 at	 stake.	 According	 to	 the	analysis	 of	 trustworthiness	 that	 I	 follow,	 someone	 is	 trustworthy	 if	 they	 are	 sufficiently	
competent	and	are	sufficiently	committed	to	acting	for	the	right	reasons.33		Imagine	you	are	planning	 to	entrust	your	 infant	 to	a	babysitter.	You	 should	do	 so	only	if	the	babysitter	is	sufficiently	competent	and	sufficiently	committed	to	securing	your	child’s	welfare.	 Lacking	 either	makes	 them	untrustworthy	 and	 so	makes	 entrusting	 your	infant	to	their	care	inappropriate.	If	you	have	a	sibling	who	is	absolutely	committed	to	your	child’s	 welfare	 but	 is	 absolutely	 incompetent	 with	 respect	 to	 infant	 care,	 then	 they	 are	untrustworthy	 as	 a	 babysitter.	 Similarly,	 a	 skilled	 babysitter	 who	 was	 your	 enemy	 and	wished	 your	 child	 harm	would	 not	 be	 sufficiently	 trustworthy.	 In	 both	 cases	 entrusting	your	child’s	welfare	to	them	is	unjustified	because	you	should	not	make	yourself	and	your	child	 vulnerable	 to	 their	 decisions	 given	 their	 untrustworthiness:	 if	 you	 give	 them	 the	discretionary	 control	 that	 entrusting	 entails,	 they	 are	 likely	 to	 set	 back	 your	 child’s	interests,	perhaps	disastrously.	Deference	requires	trustworthiness	because	deference	entails	entrusting	important	interests	to	another	and	to	their	choices,	opening	a	space	where	they	can	harm	you	at	their	discretion.	This	directs	us	to	the	fourth	condition:		
the	trustworthiness	condition:	a	person	can	have	authority	over	another	only																																																																					33	This	is	a	modified	version	of	Baier’s	account	of	trust.	See	Fricker,	pp.	256-7	for	the	modification.	
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when	 the	 potential	 authority	 is	 sufficiently	 trustworthy	 relative	 to	 how	vulnerable	the	potential	subject	would	become	by	deferring.		The	 competence	 component	 of	 trustworthiness	 is	 relatively	 straightforward.34	 The	commitment	 component	 of	 trustworthiness	 is	 more	 distinctive.	 Even	 if	 someone	 is	supremely	competent	and	understands	the	role	of	authorities,	if	she	lacks	a	commitment	to	the	right	reasons	then	she	can	undermine	and	otherwise	set	back	your	interests	in	a	variety	of	ways.35		Consider	the	injured	hikers	case	with	the	modification	that	your	hiking	partner	is	a	doctor	 primarily	 interested	 in	 studying	 hiking	 injuries.	 The	 doctor	 is	 committed	 to	 the	wrong	 reasons,	 to	 research	 rather	 than	 assistance,	 so	 you	 should	 not	 defer	 to	 their	commands.	 Even	 if	 the	 doctor	 claims	 they	 are	 assisting,	 their	 commitment	 to	 the	wrong	reasons	 gives	 you	 sufficient	 grounds	 to	 reject	 their	demand	 for	deference.	The	most	 you	should	do	is	examine	the	plausibility	of	their	imperatives	with	your	own	judgment,	keeping	a	wary	eye	out	for	misleading	directives.	In	that	case	you	would	not	be	deferring	to	them	as	a	 genuine	 authority	 but	merely	 gleaning	 information	 from	 them	 as	 a	 potentially	 reliable	guide	to	your	reasons.	Imagine	 that	 the	 trustworthiness	 condition	 is	not	met.	Then	 the	 subject	would	be	under	 the	 control	 of	 someone	 who	 is	 likely	 to	 abuse	 their	 power,	 whether	 due	 to	incompetence,	to	ill-will,	or	to	commitment	to	the	wrong	reasons.	In	any	of	these	cases	the	purpose	 and	 role	 of	 authority	 would	 again	 be	 stymied.	 We	 would	 be	 unreasonably	requiring	people	to	make	themselves	vulnerable	in	cases	where	such	vulnerability	is	both	risky	and	ineffective.			 We	now	have	the	entire	relational	conception	of	authority	before	us.	When	the	four	conditions	 are	 met,	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 authorities	 and	subjects	can	be	explained	and	the	various	signals	and	commitments	that	commands	involve	can	 be	 justified.	 In	 such	 circumstances,	 one	 person	 has	 genuine	 practical	 authority	 over	another	 because	 the	 subject	 is	 under	 a	 duty,	 the	 authority’s	 commands	 take	 precedence	over	the	subject’s	 judgment	 in	 the	 fulfillment	of	 that	duty,	 the	authority	understands	and	accepts	 the	accompanying	responsibility,	and	 the	authority	 is	 sufficiently	 trustworthy	 for	the	subject	to	make	herself	vulnerable	by	deferring	to	the	authority’s	will.		 Consider	the	original	hikers	case.	As	seems	clearly	correct	to	me,	your	doctor	friend	has	genuine	authority	over	you	because	1)	you	have	a	duty	to	medically	aid	the	hikers,	2)																																																																					34	Competence	goes	beyond	the	precedence	condition	because	it	includes	elements	about	the	actual	activity	of	issuing	 commands	 to	 achieve	 certain	 ends.	 If	 someone	 could	 not	 make	 the	 content	 of	 their	 commands	comprehensible,	for	example,	they	would	be	incompetent,	even	if	their	judgment	in	that	domain	was	superb.	35	Two	sets	of	reasons	are	relevant:	 the	subject’s	reasons	regarding	 fulfillment	of	her	grounding	duties	and	the	 authority’s	 reasons	 regarding	 the	 possession	 and	 exercise	 of	 a	 power.	 The	 precedence	 and	trustworthiness	conditions	concern	the	former,	while	the	acceptance	condition	concerns	the	latter.	
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she	 is	an	expert	on	the	medical	reasons,	3)	she	accepts	responsibility	 for	your	deference,	and	4)	she	 is	 sufficiently	 trustworthy.	The	 thought	 is	very	simple:	you	must	do	what	she	says	regardless	of	your	judgment	on	the	matter	because	people’s	lives	are	at	stake	and	she	is	 a	 well-meaning	 doctor.	 Medical	 doctors	 have	 practical	 authority	 over	 laypeople	 in	medical	emergencies	ceteris	paribus.		 Returning	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 authority,	 we	 can	 see	 how	 the	 conditions	 relate	 to	preemption	and	content-independence.	The	duty	and	precedence	conditions	help	explain	preemption:	 the	 authority’s	 command	 takes	 on	 the	 force	 of	 the	 grounding	 duty	 and	 so	preempts	 reasons	 in	 conflict	 with	 that	 duty,	 while	 it	 preempts	 the	 subject’s	 alternative	possible	 avenues	 for	 fulfilling	 that	 duty	 due	 to	 the	 command	 taking	 precedence.	 The	acceptance	 and	 trustworthiness	 conditions	 help	 explain	 content-independence:	 the	subject’s	reason	to	obey	 is	based	on	the	authority’s	commitment	to	the	subject’s	reasons,	acceptance	 of	 the	 responsibility	 of	 command,	 and	 trustworthiness.	 It	 is	 features	 of	 the	speaker	 and	not	 the	 content	 of	 the	 speech	 act	 that	 explain	how	 the	 command	binds	 and	why	the	subject	should	defer.		 IV.	Assessing	the	Relational	Conception		The	advantages	of	the	relational	conception	of	authority	are	best	seen	in	comparison	to	the	service	 conception.	While	 the	main	 differences	 rest	 in	 the	way	 the	 relational	 conception	treats	 the	 authority,	 and	 so	 in	 the	 acceptance	 and	 trustworthiness	 conditions,	 the	 duty	condition	 matters	 as	 well.	 We	 can	 see	 all	 three	 at	 work	 in	 the	 case	 of	 consent-based	authority.	 Raz	 denies	 that	 consent	 can	 ground	 genuine	 authority	 without	 the	 service	conception	 being	 met	 otherwise;	 consent	 is	 only	 an	 “auxiliary”	 or	 “secondary”	consideration	 on	 his	 view.36	 This	 is	 puzzling	 in	 the	 context	 of	 contemporary	 political	philosophy,	where	consent	is	widely	considered	the	ideal	ground	of	genuine	authority.			 Raz’s	 dismissal	 of	 consent	 is	 a	 direct	 result,	 though,	 of	 his	 focus	 on	 the	 general	question	of	the	rationality	and	desirability	of	deference.	Consent	makes	little	difference	to	these	questions.	You	should	only	consent	to	defer	where	there	are	already	weighty	reasons	indicating	that	deference	 is	rational	or	desirable,	so	 it	 is	already	the	case	that	 the	service	conception	 applies.	 By	 contrast,	 focusing	 on	who	 has	 the	 right	 to	 decide,	 as	 in	 the	 duty	condition,	is	quite	different.	Because	consent	can	create	a	duty	where	none	existed,	consent	can	create	the	context	for	the	duty	condition	to	be	fulfilled	where	it	would	not	otherwise.	On	the	relational	conception	consent	can	independently	ground	authority.		 The	 acceptance	 and	 trustworthiness	 conditions	 mark	 the	 limits	 of	 consensual	authority.	You	can	consent	to	make	someone	an	authority	over	you	where	such	consent	is	imprudent.	But	 if	 they	 ignore	 the	 limits	of	 authority,	 for	example	by	commanding	you	 to																																																																					36	Raz,	“Government	by	Consent”	and	The	Morality	of	Freedom,	p.	93.		
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commit	 murder	 or	 suicide,	 they	 fail	 the	 acceptance	 and	 trustworthiness	 conditions.	Although	consent	makes	these	conditions	less	stringent	because	they	are	in	part	based	in	the	 reasons	 that	 you	 waived	 when	 you	 consented	 to	 obey,	 they	 do	 not	 fall	 out	 of	 the	analysis.	 Reasons	 that	 you	 did	 not	 and	 could	 not	waive,	 such	 as	 those	 regarding	 others’	right	to	live,	still	constrain	the	authority	and	determine	whether	she	counts	as	committing	to	and	responding	to	the	right	set	of	reasons.	In	sum,	Raz’s	mishandling	of	consent-based	authority	 arises	 from	 his	 strict	 focus	 on	 how	 the	 subject	 should	 respond	 to	 reasons.	 By	taking	 a	 more	 complete	 view,	 the	 relational	 conception	 not	 only	 accommodates	 but	illuminates	the	possibility	of	consent-based	authority.		 I	have	gestured	at	this	comparison	to	Raz	throughout	my	discussion,	but	now	I	can	state	it	clearly.	Raz	analyzes	authority	through	the	frame	of	the	subject’s	problems,	i.e.	the	rationality	of	deference	and	its	compatibility	with	autonomy.	This	narrow	frame	results	in	the	service	conception’s	thin	set	of	normative	conditions	on	authority,	which	in	turn	makes	authority	too	easy	to	achieve	and	so	finds	authority	in	many	places	where	there	is	merely	good	 reason	 to	 use	 an	 outside	 source	 for	 guidance	 in	 making	 decisions.	 I	 began	 with	 a	wider	 frame	 by	 inquiring	 into	 the	 relationship	 that	 obtains	 when	 one	 person	 demands	practical	deference	 from	another.	This	encompasses	 the	subject’s	problems	but	adds	 two	important	general	elements.	First,	the	authority	has	her	own	set	of	problems	because	she	is	demanding	 another	 person	 make	 themselves	 vulnerable	 to	 her	 and	 so	 must	 accept	 the	weighty	 responsibility	 of	 command.	 Second,	 the	 subject’s	 position	 is	 shaped	 by	 her	vulnerability	 as	much	as	by	 the	desirability	of	deference;	her	 reason	 to	defer	 is	based	 in	significant	part	on	the	authority’s	signal	that	the	demand	for	deference	is	appropriate	and	on	the	accompanying	signals	of	responsibility	and	trustworthiness.	These	general	elements	led	 us	 to	 the	 four	 conditions	 on	 authority,	 which	 both	 amend	 and	 extend	 the	 service	conception.	Authority	does	not	appear	whenever	it	is	more	desirable	to	defer	to	another;	it	is	constrained	to	circumstances	where	one	person	stands	in	the	appropriate	relationship	to	demand	deference	from	another.	Finally,	while	the	relational	analysis	focuses	on	interpersonal	features	of	authority,	I	intend	 the	 relational	 conception	 to	 capture	 all	 kinds	 of	 practical	 authority,	 importantly	including	 political	 authority.	 A	 potential	 objection	 rests	 precisely	 in	 this	 individual	orientation:	authority	is	most	often	institutional	in	our	world	and	it	is	unclear	whether	the	relational	conception	explains	authority	in	that	context.		There	are	two	worries	here.	First,	it	may	appear	as	if	I	am	claiming	that	institutional	authority	 rests	 on	 the	 characteristics	 of	 individuals:	 on	 whether	 individuals	 within	 the	institution	are	sufficiently	trustworthy,	accept	the	responsibilities	of	command,	and	so	on.	But	 this	 is	 implausible	 because,	 first,	 institutions	 can	 mask	 or	 change	 individual	characteristics.	More	fundamentally,	as	Scott	Shapiro	argues,	“Because	the	legitimacy	of	an	official's	 authority	 is	 impersonal,	 dependent	 as	 it	 is	 on	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 office,	 the	
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personal	 qualities	 of	 any	 official	 can	 contribute	 nothing	 to	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 official's	authority.”37		Nothing	 I	 argued	 above	 commits	me	 to	 the	 view	 that	 institutional	 authority	must	rest	 in	 the	 characteristics	of	 individuals.	The	 relational	 conception	 takes	 the	 institutional	whole	 as	 its	 evaluand	 because	 that	 is	where	 institutional	 authority	 ultimately	 rests.	 The	authority	of	any	given	official	is	best	understood	as	delegated	from	the	institutional	whole.	My	 conditions	 on	 authority	 regard	 possession,	 not	 necessarily	 delegation.	 For	 example,	trustworthiness	is	necessary	for	genuine	authority	but	a	particular	bureaucrat	need	not	be	individually	 and	 personally	 trustworthy	 for	 her	 to	 have	 the	 authority	 conferred	 by	 her	office.	Rather,	the	whole	system	from	which	she	received	her	delegated	authority	must	be	sufficiently	trustworthy	(including	the	rules	that	regulate	delegation	and	ensure	individual	office-holders	 do	 not	 abuse	 their	 positions).	 The	 picture	 is	more	 complex	 at	 the	 level	 of	institutions	but	the	same	conditions	hold.38		This	 raises	 the	 second	 worry:	 what	 features	 of	 the	 institutional	 whole	 do	 we	evaluate	when	applying	the	conditions?	Consider	trustworthiness	again,	analyzed	in	terms	of	competence	and	commitment	to	the	right	reasons.		Individual	trustworthiness	is	usually	assessed	via	character	traits:	“She’s	a	reliable	person,	with	a	good	heart.”	It’s	not	clear	what	it	means	for	an	institution	to	be	trustworthy	in	the	same	way	since	institutions	seem	not	to	have	character	traits	in	the	same	way	that	individuals	do.		 However,	we	commonly	ascribe	similar	character	traits	to	institutions,	understood	mainly	through	the	lens	of	institutional	design.	Competence	should	be	fairly	clear;	we	need	to	 assess	 institutional	 competence	 to	 apply	 the	 service	 conception	 as	 well.	 When	 the	Environmental	 Protection	Agency	 employs	 scientific	 experts,	 institutional	 design	 enables	that	 expertise	 to	 shape	 its	directives.	We	can	 tell	 a	 complicated	 story	about	how	various	scientists,	 administrators,	 and	 so	 on	 are	 employed	 by	 the	 agency	 and	 form	 a	 cohesive	whole	 through	 institutional	 rules	 and	 norms.	 This	 would	 explain	 how	 under	 the	 right	conditions	 the	 institution’s	 directives	 can	 constitute	 sufficiently	 competent,	 even	 expert,	directives.			 Commitment	 to	 the	 right	 reasons	 can	 similarly	 be	 constituted	 by	 institutional	accountability	 mechanisms	 rather	 than	 by	 personal	 beliefs	 or	 virtues.	 In	 the	 case	 of	political	 institutions,	 constitutions	 set	 out	what	 sorts	 of	 reasons	 the	 government	 can	 act	upon	and	which	it	can’t.	They	set	constraints	on	the	exercise	of	political	power,	for	example	through	a	bill	of	rights.	Effective	 institutional	design	and	healthy	 institutional	culture	can	partially	constitute	commitment	to	the	right	reasons.																																																																						37	Shapiro,	p.	401.		38	Any	 theory	of	 authority	will	 need	 to	make	 this	 general	move	because	 commands	 conceptually	 require	 a	specific	intention	yet	an	official	within	an	institution	may	unintentionally	exercise	authority,	e.g.	accidentally	stamping	 an	 order.	 The	 relevant	 intentionality	must	 exist	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 institution	 as	 determined	 by	institutional	rules,	not	by	individual	office-holder	mental	states.		
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	 Related	 thoughts	 show	 how	 to	 apply	 the	 acceptance	 condition.	 Governments	recognize	 the	weight	of	 their	 responsibility	and	 the	difficulty	of	exercising	authority	well	and	so	take	strides	to	make	their	reasons	explicit,	their	self-acknowledged	responsibilities	clear,	and	their	accountability	mechanisms	strong	and	public.	They	do	this	in	part	through	institutional	design—constitutions,	 the	 separation	of	powers,	 checks	 and	balances,	 etc.—but	 also	 through	 norms	 of	 transparency,	 public	 justifications,	 and	 so	 on.	 Note	 that	 the	responsibility	of	political	authorities	is	extremely	weighty,	 largely	because	failures	can	be	so	disastrous,	so	what	it	means	to	sufficiently	understand	and	accept	the	responsibility	of	command	 will	 be	 much	 more	 demanding	 than	 in	 cases	 like	 the	 emergency	 authority	described	 above.	 However,	 the	 general	 idea	 that	 plausible	 claimants	 to	 genuine	 political	authority	must	meet	stringent	demands	of	this	sort	in	their	institutional	design	and	culture	is	 already	 widely	 accepted.	 The	 relational	 conception	 helps	 explain	 why	 we	 think	governments	that	lack	these	features	cannot	have	genuine	political	authority.		 In	conclusion,	practical	authority	exists	to	help	people	better	fulfill	their	duties	and	meet	people’s	claims.	To	have	authority,	though,	is	to	have	the	power	to	demand	practical	deference	 from	 others,	 and	 this	 power	 is	 worrying	 both	 to	 wield	 and	 to	 be	 subject	 to.	Analyzing	 the	 relationship	 that	 obtains	 when	 such	 a	 power	 is	 exercised	 led	 me	 to	 the	relational	 conception	 of	 authority.	 Only	 if	 the	 duty,	 precedence,	 acceptance,	 and	trustworthiness	 conditions	 are	 jointly	 met	 does	 one	 person	 have	 genuine	 practical	authority	over	another.		
